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Abstract
The relationship between speed and income is established in a microeconomic model
focusing on the trade-oﬀ between travel time and the risk of receiving a penalty for
exceeding the speed limit. This is used to determine when a rational driver will choose to
exceed the speed limit. The relationship between speed and income is found again in the
empirical analysis of a cross-sectional dataset comprising 60,000 observations of car trips.
This is used to perform regressions of speed on income, distance travelled, and a number
of controls. The results are clearly statistically signiﬁcant and indicate an average income
elasticity of speed of 0.02; it is smaller at short distances and about twice as large at the
longest distance investigated of 200 km.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Increasing speeds
The issue of speeds on Danish roads has come into focus with the recent
political decision to increase the general speed limit on motorways from
110 km/h to 130 km/h. There has been a prolonged public debate concern-
ing whether speeds will actually increase after such a change and on the
likely eﬀect of increased enforcement.
Average speeds have been increasing on Danish motorways for many
years and certainly since 1986 when continuous measurement of speeds
began. In the period from 1986 to 1998, the average speed for all vehicles
in open country increased from 103 km/h to 114 km/h. The current average
speed for passenger cars is 119 km/h, while the speed limit is still 110 km/h
(Danmarks TransportForskning, 2002). This development, shown as an
index in Figure 1, represents something of a puzzle, since there is little
apparent relationship with changes in speed limits and enforcement. In
1992 the general speed limit on motorways for passenger cars was increased
from 100 to 110 km/h and there was a political decision to increase enforce-
ment, which, however, did not result in more ﬁnes being presented. There is
Figure 1
The Average Speed on Danish Motorways, Real GDP Per Capita and User Cost of Car Use
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actually a general decrease in the number of ﬁnes given over the period
from 1986 to 1998, as recorded by the police (Dansk Politi, various years).
Figure 1 also presents the increase in real GDP per capita over the same
period. It is evident that both the average speed and average income have
been increasing, but it is not possible on the basis of this short time series
to draw any ﬁrm conclusions regarding the relationship.
Nevertheless, we will advance the view that income growth is a likely
driver behind the increase in speed. We assume that car drivers generally
want to drive as fast as possible, other things being equal. They are, how-
ever, constrained by accident risk, fuel costs increasing with speed above a
certain level, and the risk of receiving a ﬁne. As income grows, fuel costs
and ﬁnes are less constraining.
There is the further relationship that driving faster can induce discomfort
through noise and vibrations. The consumer can compensate by buying a
high quality car, which is more comfortable at higher speeds. As income
grows, consumers can aﬀord better quality cars. The relationship between
income and the quality of the car is very clear and documented, for example,
in Birkeland and Fosgerau (1999). Rienstra and Rietveld (1996) ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship between income and the maximum speed of the
car, whereby not only the higher income groups have faster cars but also
the low income group.
The price of quality may also have had a separate eﬀect. Figure 1 also
shows a real user cost index for car ownership, including costs of vehicles,
maintenance, annual tax and fuel (Danmarks Statistik, 2003). Until 1991
the user cost index had increased by 19 percentage points, followed by a
long decrease of 24 percentage points until 1998. It is likely that this devel-
opment has also had some eﬀect on the observed average speed, but we
shall not focus on this issue.
Thus, we expect average speed to increase with average income. In
this paper we shall show this in a simple microeconomic model and then
validate the relationship using a large cross-sectional dataset.
1.2 Literature review
The previous literature contains little on the relationship between speed and
income. There are more studies on the relationship between economic
factors and crashes. Recently, Scuﬀham and Langley (2002) performed a
time-series analysis of the number of crashes using real GDP and un-
employment as explanatory variables. Both variables are closely related
to personal incomes. Their results suggest that increases in income were
associated mainly with increases in exposure to a crash, proxied by distance
travelled, but they did not detect a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of income on the
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risk of a crash for a given level of exposure. They note that increasing
income may increase the level of vehicle safety and thereby decrease the
risk of a crash. On the other hand, drivers may compensate for lower
risk by driving faster, with less attention or less concern for safety. They
do not consider the direct eﬀect of income on speed.
Hakim and Shefer (1991) review a number of macromodels for road
accidents. Generally, income inﬂuences the demand for travel, which in
turn inﬂuences the number of accidents. In the long run, income growth
could increase the demand for safer cars and the supply of safer roads,
leading to a decrease in the fatality rate per km for a given demand for
travel. They argue that including both income and the demand for travel
as independent variables in the same model will lead to biased estimates
due to the double-counting occurring, when income is also a determinant
of travel demand.
From the point of view of this paper it is interesting to note a similar
problem in some of the papers reviewed by Hakim and Shefer, where both
average speed and income (in some form) are used to explain the number
of accidents. Zlatoper (1991) also includes both speed and income to explain
the number of accidents in a single regression. But average speed must be
regarded as an endogenous variable depending on income, as we shall
argue in this paper, and thus inclusion of both as independent variables in
a single regression is likely to bias results.
Gander (1985) presents a household utility model with highway auto-
mobile speed and uncertain enforcement, focusing on the risk attitude of
the driver and the eﬀect on optimal speed of such attitude. This model is
in many ways similar to the one presented here, except we do not focus
on the risk behaviour, which allows for some simpliﬁcation. Rietveld and
Shefer (1998) discuss speed limits and ﬁnes as a means to correct for
externalities. They consider speciﬁcally the case of heterogeneous drivers
with diﬀerent optimal speeds, but do not analyse the cause of these
diﬀerences.
Empirical results on the relationship between speed and income are hard
to come by. Some results are found in Shinar et al. (2001) who study
interview data, including a question on how often respondents drive at or
below the speed limit. The results indicate a clear signiﬁcant relationship
between income and whether the respondent stated that he/she observed
the speed limit ‘‘all the time’’. Similarly, there were relationships between
the probability of observing speed limits and age, sex, and education.
Rienstra and Rietveld (1996) ﬁnd similar results. In contrast to both
Shinar et al. and Rienstra and Rietveld we study directly the speed rather
than an indirect binary variable (observe the speed limit all the time). In
addition, we have a much larger sample with almost 60,000 observations.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 39, Part 2
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With our data, it is possible to observe how the dependence of speed on
income varies with increasing travel distance.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we ﬁrst demonstrate the
relationship between speed and income in a simple theoretical model.
Then for the empirical analysis in Section 3, we use a large microdataset
from the Danish national travel survey. Finally, Section 4 contains some
concluding remarks.
2.0 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The model
Consider a consumer with a utility function UðXÞ depending on consump-
tion X . The utility function is increasing and concave in X , such that the
ﬁrst derivative is positive and the second non-positive, implying that the
consumer is risk-averse or risk-neutral. Disregarding leisure, he spends his
total time allocation T on work and travel only. We assume an increasing
and convex speed dependent fuel consumption of f ðSÞ. With a ﬁxed driving
distance normalised to 1 and travel speed S, the time spent travelling is 1=S.
Given the wage rate w as a value of time, the income available for consump-
tion is wðT  1=SÞ  f ðSÞ.
However, the consumer risks receiving a ﬁne: being caught speeding is a
random event described by the random variable C, which is 1 if caught and
0 otherwise. Using the same assumption as Gander (1985), the ﬁne is taken
to increase linearly with speed in excess of the speed limit S0, resulting in the
paymentCFðS  S0Þ, where F is the ﬁne per km/h over the speed limit. This
is the structure of ﬁnes in Denmark. Like Gander, we assume for simplicity
that S > S0, that is, the consumer always drives too fast, which is true on
average on Danish motorways. Normalising the price of consumption to
1, the consumption is then given as a function of the chosen speed and
whether the consumer is caught speeding,
XðS;CÞ ¼ wðT  1=SÞ  f ðSÞ  CFðS  S0Þ:
Substitute this into the utility function to achieve VðS;CÞ ¼ UðXðS;CÞÞ.
We assume that the probability of being caught is constant, PðC ¼ 1Þ ¼ p.
We could alternatively assume that the probability increases with speed.
However, this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis and not change
the general results.
Then the expected utility given speed is EVðS;CÞ ¼ pVðS; 1Þþ
ð1 pÞVðS; 0Þ. The consumer maximises this expected utility with respect
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to speed. Using the partial derivative of V with respect to speed,
VSðS;CÞ ¼ UXðXðS;CÞÞðw=S2  fSðSÞ  CFÞ, we compute the ﬁrst order
condition for maximum as
pUXðXðS; 1ÞÞðw=S2  fSðSÞ  FÞ þ ð1 pÞUXðXðS; 0ÞÞðw=S2  fSðSÞÞ ¼ 0:
Solving this with respect to S results in
2 logS ¼ logðwÞ þ log½pUXðXðS; 1ÞÞ þ ð1 pÞUXðXðS; 0ÞÞ
 log½pUXðXðS; 1ÞÞð fSðSÞ þ FÞ þ ð1 pÞUXðXðS; 0ÞÞfSðSÞ:
In order to avoid long and tedious derivations, we assume that the ﬁne paid is
small relative to consumption, such that jUXðXðS; 0ÞÞ UXðXðS; 1ÞÞj < e
for some small e. Note that this does not imply that
logUXðXðS; 0ÞÞ  logUXðXðS; 1ÞÞ is also small. Using this to approximate
we rewrite as
2 logS  log

w
pF þ fSðSÞ

þ logUXðXðS; 0ÞÞ  logUXðXðS; 1ÞÞ
 log

w
pF þ fSðSÞ

þ @ logUX
@X
ðXðS; 1ÞÞðXðS; 0Þ  XðS; 1ÞÞ
¼ log

w
pF þ fSðSÞ

þUXXðXðS; 1ÞÞ
UXðXðS; 1ÞÞ
FðS  S0Þ:
Introduce the notation g ¼ XðS; 1ÞUXXðXðS; 1ÞÞ=UXðXðS; 1ÞÞ and note
that g5 0 since the utility function is increasing and concave. We assume
for simplicity that g is constant. This condition is satisﬁed, for example,
for UðXÞ ¼ logðXÞ or UðXÞ ¼ X1=2. With this notation we have
2 logS ¼ log

w
pF þ fSðSÞ

 gFðS  S0Þ
XðS; 1Þ : ð1Þ
We are now ready to examine the relationship between income and speed
by diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to income logðwÞ.
2
@ logS
@ logw
¼ 1 gFS
XðS; 1Þ
@ logS
@ logw
þ gFðS  S0Þ
XðS; 1Þ
@ logXðS; 1Þ
@ logw
 fSSðSÞS
pF þ fSðSÞ
@ logS
@ logw
;
@ logS
@ logw
¼
XðS; 1Þ þ gFðS  S0Þ
@ logXðS; 1Þ
@ logw
2XðS; 1Þ þ gFS þ SfSSðSÞXðS; 1Þ
pF þ fSðSÞ
> 0:
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This shows, as expected, that speed increases with income. Similar calcula-
tions are easily performed to show that speed decreases when the probabil-
ity of receiving a ﬁne increases, when the size of the ﬁne increases, when the
speed limit increases, and when the price of fuel consumption increases.
We have not yet considered the quality of the car. One option is to intro-
duce a second term in the utility function,U ¼ ðX ;GðS;QÞÞ, describing the
driving comfort. This would decrease with speed and increase with the
quality of the car, where the quality of the car is bought at a price per
quality unit. This would intuitively preserve the conclusions made here,
with the additional conclusion that speed would decrease when the price
of quality is increased. This result is easy to derive, when the risk of a
ﬁne is neglected ðp ¼ 0Þ.
2.2 When to drive too fast
The model assumes that the driver always exceeds the speed limit. It is quite
possible to relax this assumption in order to investigate the conditions for
this choice. First, observe that when disregarding other costs, the model
shows that the consumer will always drive at or above the speed limit.
The speed limit will be violated when 2 logðS0Þ < logðw=pFÞ or when
p < w=S20F . That is, the consumer will violate the speed limit when the
probability of getting caught is less than the hourly pre-tax wage divided
by the speed limit squared and the ﬁne per kilometre per hour.
Using current Danish ﬁgures provides some indication on the inﬂuence
of ﬁnes on speeds. With S0 ¼ 110 km/h, w ¼ 72 kr/h (the sample mean in
the empirical section, using an average tax rate of 50 per cent and 1,680
working hours per year), F ¼ 54 kr/(km/h), which is the current rate on
Danish motorways, it is found that p < 1=7,600 will make a rational
driver with average income exceed the speed limit. This can be compared
to the 4,780 million kilometres driven annually on Danish motorways
(DTF, 2002) and the 9,000 cases of speed limit violations recorded annually
by the Danish police on motorways (Rigspolitichefen, 2000).1 This
corresponds to a rate of about 1/500,000. Thus, it is no surprise that the
average speed on Danish motorways is considerably above the speed limit.
2.3 Income dependent ﬁnes
According to the theoretical model, the eﬀect of income on speed occurs
because the value of time increases with income whereas the ﬁne does not.
It is clearly possible to neutralise the eﬀect of income on speed by letting
the size of the ﬁne increase with income as well. Let the ﬁne be a function
1The latter ﬁgure comprises most cases though not all.
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of income, F ¼ FðwÞ, and diﬀerentiate (1) with respect to income, demand-
ing that @S=@w ¼ 0. The resulting equation can be rearranged to show that
@ logF=@ logwðwÞ ¼ 1, when the eﬀect of speed dependent fuel consumption
is disregarded. A ﬁne that increases proportionally with income would thus
ensure that all travel at the same speed in ourmodel, except for the correction
due to fuel consumption.
3.0 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
For the empirical test of the relationship between speed and income we use
the Danish National Travel Survey, which is a continuous telephone inter-
view survey of about 15–17,000 respondents annually (Danmarks Trans-
portForskning, 2003). We select 86,491 observations of car driver trips
from the period 1996–2001, where both trip ends are outside the relatively
congested capital region around Copenhagen. Discarding observations
where income is not recorded leaves 76,001 observations. We further dis-
card 15,846 observations of trips below two kilometres, as the time involved
in starting the car and getting onto the larger roads is likely to dominate
results. We discard 225 observations of trips above 200 kilometres, as the
recorded average speed seems to decline at longer distances. This is thought
to reﬂect coﬀee breaks and so on included with the reported time of trips.
Finally, we discard 1,539 observations with average speed less than 20 km/h
and a few other observations with missing values. This leaves 58,385 obser-
vations for analysis.
The main variables are speed, income, and distance. The respondents
have stated the time and distance for each trip from which we compute
the average speed of the trip. Distance is measured in kilometres and
speed is measured in kilometres per hour. Income is the pre-tax income
of the driver, deﬂated to year 2000 prices and measured in 1,000 Danish
Kroner (DKK).2 The sample mean income is 243,000 DKK.
Table 1 presents the basic relationship in the data between speed,
income, and distance. The sample has been split by income into three
equal groups (breakpoints at 193,000 and 270,000 DKK). We further
split the sample into ﬁve distance bands. The table presents the average
speed and the number of observations in each group.
2The current exchange rate is €100¼ 743DKK.
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A number of points are noted from Table 1. First, note that the average
speed increases with distance. Trips take place on diﬀerent types of roads
with diﬀerent speed limits and traﬃc characteristics. Short trips are likely
to have a higher proportion on local urban roads with low speed limits.
Also, some time is ﬁxed regardless of the length of the trip, such as getting
from the front door to the car.
Second, average speed increases with income in each distance band.
Third, the diﬀerence in average speed from low to high income increases
as distance increases. The diﬀerence in speed is 0.9 km/h in the 2–10 km
distance band and 5.5 km/h in the 150–200 km distance band. Longer
trips are more likely to use motorways, where speeds may vary more. How-
ever, the data do not record the choice of route. For the estimation we have
a variable where the respondent has stated how large a share of the trip that
took place in built-up areas. This is a discrete variable with ﬁve levels,
ranging from ‘‘Completely in built-up area’’ to ‘‘Completely in rural
area’’. We use this variable to control for the type of road and the
corresponding speed limit.
Fourth, the proportion with medium or high income increases with
longer distances. Or stated in another way: people with higher incomes
tend to travel longer. As the average speed generally increases with distance
this may confound the eﬀect of income on speed. Hence it is not immedi-
ately possible to conclude from the table how strong is the inﬂuence of
income on speed.
There are other potential confounding factors, as the table does not
control for age, sex, and other variables, which may inﬂuence speed and
travel distances. Therefore, we perform regressions of speed on income
and distance and control for age, sex, family type (single, couple), the
presence of children (yes, no), urbanisation at the residence, the share of
Table 1
Summary Statistics: Speed, Distance and Income
Average Speed Number of Observations
Income Income
Distance Low Medium High Low Medium High
2–10 40.8 41.3 41.7 11,755 10,088 10,707
10–50 56.6 58.2 59.6 7,132 7,984 7,999
50–100 69.7 72.9 76.2 597 646 1,201
100–150 79.8 78.4 82.8 144 172 347
150–200 82.5 83.7 88.0 35 61 121
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the trip in built-up areas, and a constant. Tables 2 and 3 present some
summary statistics for the controls.
From Table 2 it is noted that men drive faster than women, they also
drive longer distances and have higher incomes. Individuals who are part
of a couple also drive faster and have higher incomes, although they
drive slightly shorter trips. People with children drive faster and have
higher incomes but drive somewhat shorter distances. It seems thus that
some of the relationship between speed and income may be explained by
sex, family type, and the presence of children in the household. Controlling
Table 3
Summary Statistics: Continuous Variables
Pairwise correlations
Variable Unit Average Median Speed Distance Income
Speed Km/h 49.9 48 1.00 0.57 0.10
Distance Km 17.3 10 0.57 1.00 0.10
Income 1,000DKK 243 228 0.10 0.10 1.00
Age Years 43.0 42 0.09 0.02 0.03
Table 2
Summary Statistics: Binary Control Variables
Variable N Share
Avg.
speed
Avg.
distance
Avg.
income
Women 24,005 0.41 47.6 14.6 198.0
Men 34,386 0.59 51.6 19.1 275.2
Single 7,816 0.13 49.7 17.4 227.1
Couple 50,575 0.87 50.0 17.2 246.0
No children 24,828 0.43 49.8 18.2 234.4
Children 33,563 0.57 50.0 16.6 250.2
Res. in Central Copenhagen 61 0.00 52.8 25.5 286.8
Res. in Greater Copenhagen 70 0.00 55.2 34.5 351.4
Res. in city >100,000 inh. 5,926 0.10 45.0 16.3 261.2
Res. in city 10–100,000 inh. 12,808 0.22 47.2 16.2 254.5
Res. in city 2–10,000 inh. 11,065 0.19 52.2 19.0 250.5
Res. in city 200–2,000 inh. 10,945 0.19 52.2 18.4 236.0
Res. in rural area 17,512 0.30 50.7 16.4 229.2
Trip completely in built-up area 12,792 0.22 40.0 7.4 251.2
Trip mainly in built-up area 5,488 0.09 44.5 11.2 255.8
Trip equally in built-up and rural area 7,383 0.13 50.3 17.4 238.9
Trip mainly in rural area 27,359 0.47 54.9 22.6 239.9
Trip completely in rural area 5,367 0.09 53.5 19.7 236.9
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for these variables will tend to reduce the apparent eﬀect of income on
speed.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables that are treated as
continuous in the analysis. We note that speed decreases with age.
3.2 Empirical model estimation
We take the main variables, speed, distance, and income, in logarithms in
order to reduce variance heterogeneity. The log of speed is regressed on
log of income, log of distance, and control variables, which are sex,
family type (single, couple), age, urbanisation dummies, dummies for
the share of the trip in built-up areas, year dummies, and a constant. A
potential selection bias is controlled for by inclusion of the inverse Mills
ratio from a binary probit model estimated on the whole survey material
for the probability of occurring in the sample for this model (Wooldridge,
2002). We estimate four models, all with White heteroskedasticity consis-
tent standard errors. Model 1 is an OLS with main eﬀects only. One may
worry that endogeneity of distance may bias results and this is also the
result of a Hausman test. Therefore model 2 is a 2SLS version of model
1 where area dummies dividing Denmark into 263 municipalities have
been used as instruments for distance. In order for these to be valid instru-
ments, they must be correlated with distance but not with the error of the
estimated equation. This is arguably the case, since distances are diﬀerent
in the speciﬁed regions and since the variable for a built-up area captures
the type of road used, which has a separate eﬀect on speed. In model 3
we include the area dummies directly into the model and estimate by
OLS. Model 4 is intended to capture more of the complicated relationship
between speed, distance, and income shown in Table 1. This model includes
income and income squared, distance and distance squared, and also
distance interacted with income and income squared. In addition, model
4 includes interactions with the controls. The model was speciﬁed using
all second-order interactions and then tested down using hierarchical
backwards elimination, which is to say that insigniﬁcant ﬁrst-order eﬀects
are not deleted if they occur in a second-order eﬀect. Model 4 is estimated
by OLS since the interactions with distance makes it quite diﬃcult to use
2SLS.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. The goodness of ﬁt is good
with R-squares of around 0.46. All variables are generally quite signiﬁcant
reﬂecting on the very large number of observations. The t-statistic for the
inverse Mills ratio acts a test for selection bias (Wooldridge, 2002), and is
not signiﬁcant in any of the models, indicating that selection bias has
little eﬀect.
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3.3 Results
Model 1 estimates an income elasticity of 0.021 with a high level of signi-
ﬁcance. In model 2 instruments are used to control for endogeneity of
distance. Since there is only one variable that may cause endogeneity
bias, it is possible to determine the direction of bias. It is likely that the
error in the speed equation will be positively correlated with the error in
an equation for distance. This would lead to a too high parameter estimate
for distance and hence the eﬀect of speed on income is probably under-
estimated. The endogeneity bias is, however, likely to be small. The time
cost of a trip increases with income and the compensation for this by
higher speed is relatively small. The results from model 2 bears this reason-
ing out with an estimated income elasticity of 0.024, again estimated with a
high level of signiﬁcance. Model 3 shows similar results with an estimated
income elasticity of 0.023, which is again very signiﬁcant.
Model 4 predicts an average speed of 32 km/h at the shortest distance
increasing to 87km/h at the longest distances. The predicted speed increases
with distance at a decreasing rate. Income enters the model interacted with
distance such that the inﬂuence of income on speed depends on trip distance.
Income also enters squared such that the derivative of the expected speed
depends on income. We evaluate the income elasticities of speed at the
sample average income and at various distances, using the parameter
estimates of model 4, where the elasticities are found as the derivative of
log(speed) with respect to log(income) and standard errors are calculated
using the estimated covariance matrix. The results indicate that the income
elasticity of speed increases with distance at a decreasing rate. At the shortest
distance the elasticity is 0.007 with a standard error of 0.003. This elasticity is
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a t-value of 2.8. At the
sample average log(distance) the income elasticity is 0.026 (0.003), which is
slightly more than in models 1–3. At the longest distances, the elasticity is
0.058 (0.002), which is highly statistically signiﬁcant. The elasticity estimates
are probably downward biased, as were model 1 compared to model 2. The
elasticities in model 3 translate into speed diﬀerences between the 10 and 90
per cent income percentiles of 0.2 km/h at 2km to 4.5km/h at 200km. This is
consistent with Rienstra and Rietveld (1996), who ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
income on speed limit transgression behaviour is more signiﬁcant on roads
with higher speed limits, when considering that roads with high speed
limits are more likely to be used on longer trips.
More comments can be applied to the parameter estimates provided here.
Generally, the results are as expected. Speed decreases with age, men drive
faster thanwomen, singles drive slightly faster than people who live in couples,
speed increases with decreasing urbanisation, that is, as the urbanisation index
increases, and speed increaseswhen less of the trip takes place in built-up areas.
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4.0 Concluding Remarks
We have employed a simple microeconomic model where a consumer
attaches a value to time and risks receiving a ﬁne with some probability.
This is suﬃcient to drive the results that speed increases with income and
decreases if the probability or the size of a ﬁne increases. Increasing the
speed limit also raises speed. The model allows for speed dependent fuel
consumption and we have indicated how the model can be extended to
allow for the quality of the car. Moreover, we have shown how an
income dependent ﬁne could approximately neutralise the eﬀect of
income on speed. A pragmatic alternative would be to rely more on non-
monetary sanctions such as withdrawal of the driving licence.
The model assumes for simplicity that the driver always exceeds the
speed limit, which is true for the majority on Danish motorways. This
fact could suggest that other marginal speed dependent costs are low.
Disregarding other speed dependent costs for a moment, the speed limit
will be violated when the probability of getting caught is low, that is,
when p < w=S20F . Using current Danish ﬁgures we have indicated that
the present rate of detection is much too low for a rational driver with
average income to observe the speed limit on motorways.
A criticism of the theoretical analysis may be that drivers do not have
consistent estimates of the probability of getting caught. There does in
fact exist a plausible mechanism whereby drivers can assess this probability.
By using the model presented, a rational driver can infer the probability
estimates of other drivers from their choice of speed. Combining these
with his own experience of getting caught results in consistent estimates
for each individual. On average these estimates depend only on the
number of ﬁnes presented.
4.1 Empirical results
Using a large cross-sectional dataset we have shown that the eﬀect of
income on speed is also observable in practice with quite noticeable and
highly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. The eﬀect is consistently present
when the model allows for endogeneity of distance, when a large number
of area dummies is used, and when the model allows for a more complex
relationship with many interactions. It is likely that the observed eﬀect
would be larger if we were able to observe the type of road and the speed
limit, since we expect that speed variation is higher on motorways and
roads with higher speed limits (Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996).
When there is a cross-sectional relationship between speed and income,
it is also likely that income growth is an important factor behind the
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observed general increase in motorway speeds. According to this explana-
tion, increasing incomes have increased the perceived value of time and
decreased the eﬀect of ﬁnes and other speed dependent user costs, which
in turn has lead to increased speeds. The eﬀect may be larger in the
aggregate than the cross-sectional data show, since aggregate behaviour
may inﬂuence individual behaviour, for example if the risk of receiving a
ﬁne is not constant but larger for individuals driving at speeds in excess
of the average.
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